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Abstract—The design of robust wireless communication sys-
tems for industrial applications such as closed loop control
processes has been considered manifold recently. Additionally,
the ongoing advances in the area of connected mobility have
similar or even higher requirements regarding system reliability
and availability. Beside unfulfilled reliability requirements, the
availability of a system can further be reduced, if it is under
attack in the sense of violation of information security goals
such as data authenticity or integrity. In order to guarantee the
safe operation of an application, a system has at least to be able
to detect these attacks. Though there are numerous techniques
in the sense of conventional cryptography in order to achieve
that goal, these are not always suited for the requirements of the
applications mentioned due to resource inefficiency. In the present
work, we show how the goal of message authenticity based on
physical layer security (PHYSEC) can be achieved. The main idea
for such techniques is to exploit user specific characteristics of the
wireless channel, especially in spatial domain. Additionally, we
show the performance of our machine learning based approach
and compare it with other existing approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, there are two major developments in the area
of wireless systems regarding highly safety critical applica-
tions such as closed loop control applications in the area
of industrial systems ([1]) and network based autonomous
driving functions in the area of vehicular systems. These have
much higher requirements regarding reliability, availability and
also latency compared to common applications, such as e.g.
media streaming or web browsing over IEEE 802.11 based
wireless systems or today’s cellular 4G LTE networks. Another
important requirement in the area of mission critical machine
type communication (MC-MTC) is the fact, that secure trans-
mission of data has to be taken into account. Due to the
sensitive information transmitted in the mentioned scenarios, it
is necessary to guarantee a high degree of information security.
Especially confidentiality, authenticity, as well as integrity of
the transmitted data has to be ensured to prohibit a wide range
of possible passive and active cyber attacks. For this purpose,
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encryption of transmitted messages is necessary in order to
be sure of the confidentiality of the respective payload and
authentication of the originator as well as integrity checking
of received messages have to be ensured before they are
consumed and processed by a safety critical application.
Although there are conventional cryptography techniques
to ensure authenticity as well as integrity of message payload,
these require a not negligible amount of resources. Especially
they lead to increase in message size due to the fact that, for
example message authentication codes (MAC), which are com-
monly used in deployed systems (e.g. in IEEE 802.15.4 based
systems), add a cryptographic check sum to the actual message
payload. The recommendation of the Internet Engineering
Task Force is to either use a CMAC (cipher based MAC), e.g.
based on a AES-128 block cipher, or a HMAC which is based
on a cryptographic hash function. For AES-128 based CMAC
a maximum shortening to 64 Bit is recommended [2], while
for HMAC a minimum MAC size of 80 Bit is recommended
[3]. If we now assume that the payload of a MC-MTC packet
in the uplink has a length of 400 Bit (the dimension of this
assumption is e.g. confirmed by [1] and [4]), then the overhead
and with this the additional latency introduced in case of a
AES-128 based CMAC of 64 Bit length would be 13.8%.
Another important issue is, that key based schemes such as
MAC are only able to protect the message payload from the
mentioned attacks. An attacker is still able to perform attacks
such as address spoofing, or even worse, record a message and
replay it after a while (if counters are used to prohibit that,
additional latency is added as well). Due to these drawbacks,
another idea is to check for message authenticity at a lower
level by taking physical properties of the radio link signal into
account. In this work, we focus on a keyless approach in order
to achieve that goal based on estimating the wireless channel
and detection of different users based on that. As mentioned,
MC-MTC is considered here, for which it is assumed that
frequent and periodic data transmissions (e.g. once per ms
[1], [4]) and with this channel estimation at the same rate is
available. For experimental evaluation, we consider an OFDM
system and based on the respective frequency domain channel
estimations, we decide from which source a received data
packet was transmitted.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. In section
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II we give a short overview on related work with respect to
previous considered approaches and in section III we describe
the system model. The machine learning approach for physical
layer based message authentication is presented in section IV.
In section V we present the results of our work in form of
an experimental evaluation of the considered approach and
section VI finally concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several approaches on exploiting the wireless channel for
security purposes, also known as PHYSEC, have been inves-
tigated recently. In [5] a good overview on this topic is given.
While many works have focused on extracting secret keys
between two communicating devices, such as [6], [7], [8],
the focus of our work is on guaranteeing secure transmission
with respect to authenticity of data packets from one device
to another. One of the first works considering that idea has
been for example [9], where an approach based on channel
measurements and hypothesis testing is presented for static
scenarios and is later in [10] extended to time-variant sce-
narios. Though the results of these works are plausible, they
are obtained from simulations of the wireless channel only.
Therefore, in our work we will focus on real world channels.
In [11], two approaches based on machine learning, Support
Vector Machine and Linear Fisher Discriminant Analysis, are
presented. The approach considered in [12] is similar to our
approach, as they propose a CSI-based authentication method.
However, they consider a single carrier system, while we will
focus on a multi carrier system in our work. The second
approach considered in [12] is whiteness of residuals testing.
In [13] an RSSI-based approach for body area networks is
presented. The work in [14] considers a multilayer approach
based on OFDM to guarantee authentication of TCP packets.
A Gaussian Mixture Model based technique in combination
with exploitation of the channel responses for different antenna
modes is considered in [15]. In [16] a MIMO OFDM system
is considered and a generalized likelihood ratio test is used
as detection method. Further, the authors derive information
theoretic bounds for the channel based detection problem.
The authors in [17] consider a cellular Internet-of-Things
system and propose a scheme for channel based message
authentication of nodes with the help of anchor nodes, which
are assumed to have set up trust to the concentrator node
before.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we describe the system model and the channel
model considered in our work. Further, the attacker model is
introduced.
A. Communication Model
We consider two users, Alice and Bob, who want to
exchange authenticated messages with each other over a public
channel. A third user Eve, who is an adversarial user, tries to
inject illegal messages masqueraded as one of the legal users
Alice or Bob. Fig. 1 shows the possible message flows for all
considered users. Messages transmitted by users are denoted
with xu and messages received by users with yu, where u
denotes user Alice (u = A), Bob (u = B) or Eve (u = E).
Fig. 1: System Model
B. Channel Model and Channel Estimation
In our work, we focus on channel state information (CSI),
which is e.g. computed at the receiver side in form of a
frequency domain channel estimation. The main idea for
all PHYSEC based techniques is to make use of the fast
spatial decorrelation property of the wireless channel. For that
purpose, the users need to be able estimate the channel to each
other. The received signal at a user ui is
yui = Huiujxuj + nuiuj (1)
with
Huiuj = [h
0
uiuj , . . . , h
M−1
uiuj ] (2)
being the M -dimensional channel matrix of the frequency-
selective SISO fading channel between user ui and uj (trans-
mitter) and h`uiuj being the gain of the `-th sample in
frequency domain (` = 0, . . . ,M − 1). It can be estimated
as
Hˆuiuj = Huiuj + uiuj (3)
by user ui. Due to noise nuiuj which is modelled as a gaussian
random variable with zero mean and variance σ2nuiuj the
channel estimation is not perfect and errors uiuj occur.
C. Attacker Model
A typical scenario for an attacker Eve is, that he is at
a spatially different location compared to Bob and Alice
(we assume a distance of more than the wavelength of the
transmitted signal respectively) and uses advanced equipment
such as directed antennas and high sensitivity receivers in
order to maximize the coverage to his benefit. We also assume
perfect knowledge of the underlying communication protocol
at Eve to run active attacks such as masquerade attacks, replay
attacks or address spoofing attacks by introducing messages
xE. It is further assumed, that Eve is able to eavesdrop
on ongoing transmissions of Alice (yE = HEAxA + nEA)
and Bob (yE = HEBxB + nEB) and estimate the respective
channels HEA and HEB. With this information, Eve is able
to manipulate its injected messages xE with a pre-processing
filter GE in such a way, that the channel between the legal
users is imitated. For this work we assume that GE = 1
and with this HAE 6= HAB and HBE 6= HBA. It is not
assumed that Eve is gaining physical access to Alice or Bob
to accomplish invasive attacks such as hardware modification.
Further, other active attacks such as Denial-of-Service attacks
due to jamming are not considered as well. It is assumed,
that the legal communicating participants Bob and Alice have
already carried out initial user authentication to each other
and have set up trust in a secure way. Attacks on the initial
authentication stage are not considered.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING AND CHANNEL BASED
AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we show how channel based message authen-
tication with the help of machine learning can be achieved. In
general, all machine learning algorithms contain two stages. In
the first stage, the respective algorithm needs to be trained to
the kind of data it is intended to estimate. In our case, this data
are channel estimations taken on received data packets. If we
now consider the users Alice and Bob again, e.g. Bob wants to
transmit authenticated messages to Alice. Alice will estimate
the channel as HˆAB(k) during the training phase for each of
the T received messages yA(k), k = 0, . . . , T − 1. In this
stage we also assume, that the acquired data is labeled. This
means that the messages xB sent by Bob contain cryptographic
information from higher layers (e.g. certificates) in order to
authenticate to Alice initially during that stage. The acquired
data HˆAB(k) and the respective labels are fed to the training
procedure of the machine learning algorithm. In the second
stage, the trained model is used in order to make a decision on
further received messages yA(m) at time m. If Alice estimates
the channel now as Hˆ(m), there are two hypothesis, either
H0 : yA(m) was sent by Bob, or
H1 : yA(m) was not sent by Bob.
(4)
In case of hypothesis H0
Hˆ(m) = HAB(m) + AB(m), (5)
and in case of hypothesis H1
Hˆ(m) 6= HAB(m) + AB(m). (6)
Due to temporal variations in the channel HAB, these need
to be somehow considered in the second stage. Otherwise it
is not possible to distinguish between channel variations and
messages introduced by an attacker anymore at some point.
There are two possibilities in order to achieve that goal, either
the machine learning algorithm needs to be updated regularly,
or instead of this, the difference of the current channel estimate
to the previous one
∆Hˆ(m) = Hˆ(m)− Hˆ(m− 1) (7)
is used as input data for the machine learning algorithm. In
the first case, the model update interval should be below the
channel coherence time Tc of the HAB channel in order to
catch up with these variations. Whereas in both cases, the
temporal difference between two subsequent channel estima-
tions should always be below Tc. Fig. 2 shows all steps of the
general procedure described above.
Fig. 2: Channel based Message Authentication using Machine
Learning
Every machine learning estimator has basically two main
performance indicators, the detection probability PD and the
false alarm rate PFA. In our case, the detection probability
PD = p(H1|Hˆ(m) due to xE) (8)
denotes the probability of detecting Eve as the transmitter of
yA(m) under the condition that it was truly sent by Eve and
the false alarm rate
PFA = p(H1|Hˆ(m) due to xB) (9)
denotes the probability of detecting Eve as the transmitter of
yA(m) under the condition that it was truly sent by Bob. Both
performance metrics need to be considered jointly, as they can
not be optimized independently. The relation of both can be
shown in a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
V. RESULTS
In this section we describe our setup for the experimental
evaluation and show the results of our work. Further, we
compare them with results of related work.
A. Experimental setup
To evaluate our concepts, we use USRP N210 SDR plat-
forms from Ettus Research with SBX daughterboards. We use
GNURadio OFDM transmitter and receiver blocks to process
data packets and perform channel estimation on each received
data packet. A setup with an FFT size of 64 is considered and
48 active subcarriers. The cyclic prefix length is 16 samples
at a baseband sample rate of 3.125 MSps, whereas the carrier
frequency is 2.45 GHz. For each received data packet, the
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Fig. 3: Misdetection rate for different false alarm rates
initial channel taps are calculated based on the known Schmidl
and Cox preamble [18] which is also used to calculate the
frequency offset at the receiver (actually this preamble consists
of two OFDM symbols). In each message, this preamble is
followed by 37 data symbols yielding a time resolution of
998.4 µs for the channel estimations. As a first step, we
consider a static setup where all participants do not move
during transmitting and receiving. The environment is a mixed
office/lab area with a lot of objects and metal walls. Due to
this we assume that at least some amount of multipath prop-
agation is existing and with this frequency selective channels.
We record data for several different locations of Bob and
Eve respectively, yielding multiple different constellations of
Bob-Alice and Eve-Alice pairs.
We choose Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) based clus-
tering as detection method in order to authenticate received
messages. We considered a block size of N = 1000 data sets
in order to update the GMM, whereas one block is used for
training the model and 99 blocks are used in order to test it.
The attack intensity was kept at 50%. We use the magnitude
of normalized channel estimations
F (m) =
∣∣Hˆ(m)∣∣
M−1∑`
=0
∣∣∣hˆ`(m)∣∣∣ (10)
as input data (feature) for the GMM estimator.
B. Performance of GMM based Clustering
Fig. 3 shows the probability of misdetection
PMD = 1− PD (11)
or misdetection rate (MDR) in dependence of the number of
estimated subcarriers M used for the detection. The influence
of the accuracy of the channel estimation in the sense of
different dimensions of the feature vector F (m) can be seen,
as for increasing values of M the MDR overall drops. If only
M = 4 subcarriers (equally spaced) are considered, the MDR
of the GMM method is at 25.68% at a false alarm rate of
0.1% and at 0.47% at a false alarm rate of 1%. For the case
of M = 16 subcarriers (equally spaced) considered, the MDR
decreases by 99.67% to 0.08% at a false alarm rate of 0.1%
and by 85.11% to 0.07% at a false alarm rate of 1%. In case
of the MSE based detection method from [19], the MDR is
at 43.03% in case of M = 4 and 1% false alarm rate, which
is an increase of 9055.32% compared to the GMM method
and in case of a false alarm rate of 0.1%, the MDR is at
89.21%, which is an increase of 247.39% compared to the
GMM method. In case of M = 16, the MDR of the MSE
based method is at 33.62% at a false alarm rate of 1%, which
is an increase of 479.29% compared to the GMM method.
For a false alarm of 0.1% the MDR is at 85.36%, which is an
increase of 1066% compared to the GMM method.
Fig. 4 shows the influence of the updating process within
the GMM based clustering method. If the updating process
of the model is switched off, the detection rate decreases
significantly. At a false alarm rate of 1%, the detection rate for
GMM based detection without updating is at 88.06%, which
is a performance loss of 11.9% compared to the GMM based
detection with updating. However, the GMM based method
without updating still outperforms the MSE based method
(65.78% detection rate) by a 33.87% higher detection rate.
For a false alarm rate of 0.1%, the MSE method performance
loss is even worse as the detection rate decreases to 17.69%
which is 79.53% less compared to the GMM method without
updating (86.43% detection rate) and 82.3% less compared
to the GMM method with updating (99.96% detection rate).
The performance loss for the GMM method without updating
compared to the GMM method with updating is 13.54%.
C. Discussion of Results
The experimental evaluation of our method shows us ba-
sically two things. The first one is, that the performance of
our GMM based clustering method increases as the dimension
of the considered feature, which is in our case the number
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TABLE I: Performance of related work (selection)
Work Detection Method Feature max. PD min. PFA
[15] GMM Antenna Mode 99.9% 0.4%
[11] SVM, LFDA RSSI, TOA, CC 95% 1%
[12] NPHT CIR (TD) 99.9% 1%
[10] NPHT CIR (FD) 99% 1%
Here GMM CIR (FD) 99.96% 0.1%
of equally spaced estimated frequency points M for each re-
ceived message, also increases (with this the misdetection rate
decreases). However, if the model that classifies the input data
is not updated (or a method that does not consider updating
of the classifier during operation is used), the performance is
decreased, which leads to the conclusion that only classifiers
which allow for online updating fulfill the needs for the
channel based authentication approach.
If we compare our GMM based approach with related ones
(see Tab. I), the performance of it is similar to them, though
some of them use different features that are fed to the detection
method (which as well differs from our detection method in
some cases). Overall, our approach performs comparable to
the approaches of the related work, and compared to e.g. [11]
even slightly better for the detection rate (5.22% higher) and
in case of the false alarm rate (90% lower), the performance
is better as well.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our proposed method of taking user specific channel charac-
teristics in form of the frequency domain OFDM channel esti-
mation into account in order to identify and authenticate them
seems to be a promising technique in order to achieve that goal
in a very efficient way. Especially for MC-MTC messages, the
application of channel based message authentication can lead
to reduced transmission latency. Further, the combination of
both, MC-MTC and channel based authentication is essen-
tial considering system efficiency, as both rely on frequent
transmission of data packets. With this, frequent channel
estimations are available, which can be reused with little to no
further effort. Though the maximum achieved detection rate is
high at 99.96%, the method needs still to be improved in order
to get more reliable decisions. For that purpose, additional
features within the detection process such as RSSI or TOA
might be helpful. Further, the tradeoff between complexity and
performance of the detection method is an issue that needs
to be addressed in future work. Therefore additional detection
methods could be investigated. To gain robustness due to errors
in channel estimation induced by noise, approaches such as in
[20] might be suited in order to reduce this effect based on pre-
processing of channel estimates. Additionally we also want to
focus on a mobile setup with little to moderate velocities in
order to verify that the method also works well under these
conditions.
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